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Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, courts have wrestled with what it
means to be an arranger under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). One aspect of
arranger liability that has undergone radical change in the past decade is the
useful product doctrine, which allows a party to escape arranger liability by
proving it was selling a useful product rather than arranging for disposal.
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts applied the useful product
doctrine restrictively, only allowing parties selling virgin products to
escape liability and imposing liability on parties selling useful secondary
products. Following Burlington Northern, this shifted, with courts requiring
concrete evidence of intent in arrangements for disposal and allowing
parties selling secondary products to escape liability even when their
actions directly contributed to environmental contamination.
This Note argues that this shift in the useful product doctrine will
negatively impact the Superfund litigation landscape, and more
importantly, the environment. This Note also posits that the shift in the
useful product doctrine can be correlated to a shift in administrative law,
away from deferring to agency decisions and towards a more searching
judicial inquiry. This Note argues that the courts should scale back their
permissive approach to the useful product doctrine and give greater weight
to agency expertise and agency liability determinations when ruling on
arranger liability cases in the useful product arena.
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INTRODUCTION
When carbonless copy paper was introduced in 1953 by chemists at
the National Cash Register Corporation (NCR), it revolutionized the world
of paper forms by reducing waste.1 Nonetheless, NCR simultaneously made
the fateful decision to sell scraps from the carbonless paper, known as
“broke,” to paper companies that used it as recyclable fiber.2 These paper
companies, located on the Fox River in central Wisconsin, in turn
discharged into the river as a part of their production process.3
Despite being quickly eclipsed by copy machines, carbonless paper
has maintained a legacy, albeit not a happy one. Until about 1971, high
levels of cancer-causing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were dumped
into the Fox River by the paper companies that purchased NCR’s broke.4 A
lengthy, billion-dollar cleanup effort followed and, predictably, lawsuits

1

See The Who, What When Where & Why of NCR Forms - No Carbon Required, MARSID M&M
GROUP, http://www.mmprint.com/NCRForm-Printing-History.cfm [https://perma.cc/NLA3-Q6XZ];
Appvion Marks 60 Years of Making Carbonless Paper, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/appvion-marks-60-years-of-making-carbonless-paper251943771.html [https://perma.cc/RA88-9FK7].
2
Appleton Papers, Inc., v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 776 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861 (E.D. Wis.
2011).
3
Id.; Lower Fox River and Green Bay Site, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/region5/cleanup/foxriver/
[https://perma.cc/WAS9-QJJS] (last updated Nov. 14, 2016).
4
Appleton, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Lower Fox River, supra note 3.
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ensued.5 These lawsuits required judges to consider whether and to what
extent a company like NCR should be held responsible for its role in
environmental contamination—a form of legal responsibility known as
arranger liability.
Arranger liability lies within the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”),
the federal statute designed to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous
substances.6 In addition to liability for arranging for disposal of a hazardous
substance, a potentially responsible party (PRP) can also be found liable if
it is a current owner or operator of the facility, was the owner or operator at
the time of disposal, or if it transported waste to a facility.7
Courts have wrestled with arranger liability8 since the Supreme
Court’s seminal 2009 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. United States9 dramatically changed the standard for this type of
CERCLA liability.10 Judicial decisions before Burlington Northern favored
a broad interpretation of the arranger provision, subjecting those who
arrange for hazardous waste disposal to a strict liability standard.11 The

5

Lower Fox River, supra note 3; Paul Srubas, Fox River PCB Liability Reshuffled in Judge’s
Ruling, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE (May 20, 2015, 8:06 AM), http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/
story/news/local/2015/05/19/ncrs-liability-fox-river-pcb-cleanup-reduced-judges-ruling/27613087/
[https://perma.cc/6G82-HEZE].
6
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2012).
7
Id. § 9607(a).
8
Arranger liability, sometimes referred to as generator liability, is a rather nebulous concept. The
statute says that an arranger is
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances . . . .
Id. If a party produces a hazardous substance and then contracts for disposal off-site, that qualifies as
arranging for disposal. See Anna Marple DuBoise, Expanding the Scope of Arranger Liability Under
CERCLA, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (1995). However, as will be discussed, the sale of a useful
product that happens to contain a hazardous component would not qualify as arrangement for disposal.
See id. It is the many scenarios that fall between these two poles of arranger liability that makes the
concept so complex. See id.
9
556 U.S. 599 (2009).
10
Katrina J. Brown, Comment, Contaminating the Superfund: Arranger Liability and the Evolution
of CERCLA’s Not-So-Strict Liability, 11 WYO. L. REV. 485, 507–08 (2011).
11
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled on other
grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Dorothy B. Godwin Living Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994) (“CERCLA liability has been
described as ‘a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it.’” (quoting Jerry L.
Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1993))); United States v. Monsanto
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standard to qualify as an arranger was quite low and could be established
through either direct or circumstantial evidence that indicated that the
arranger knew12 or should have known of the ultimate disposal.13
Burlington Northern fundamentally altered the liability analysis for
arrangers by requiring that a party possess actual intent to dispose, rather
than mere knowledge of disposal.14 Since Burlington Northern, the doctrine
has continued to shift, moving towards a world of lessened liability for
arrangers who can make a colorable argument that they were selling a
useful product.
This Note falls within a broader framework of scholarship that
addresses arranger liability, but it is the first to address the implications of a
recent doctrinal shift in one specific area in which arranger liability has
continued to change following Burlington Northern: the useful product
doctrine. According to this doctrine, a PRP that sells hazardous material
can escape arranger liability if it can prove that it was selling a useful
product rather than arranging for disposal.15 Since Burlington Northern
narrowed the definition of arranger, courts across the country have become
increasingly permissive in allowing PRPs to raise the useful product
doctrine defense and escape arranger liability.16 This represents a departure
from earlier useful product cases, where parties were held to a higher
standard and rarely skirted arranger liability.17 This shift can be exemplified

Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has
interpreted section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme.”).
12
United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996).
13
See Jayna M. Cacioppo, Burlington Northern Limits on “Arranger” Liability Bleed into
California Statutory Law, TAFT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.taftlaw.com/news/publications/detail/
1229-i-burlington-northern-i-limits-on-arranger-liability-bleed-into-california-statutory-law
[https://perma.cc/TM4U-4KPE].
14
556 U.S. at 612.
15
Marc P. Lawrence, To Arrange or Not to Arrange: Intent Is the Question, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2009,
at 48, 50. A clear example of a successful use of the useful product doctrine would be the sale of a new
but hazardous material that later contaminated the environment. This could occur with chemicals or
new products with a hazardous component such as mercury thermometers or automotive batteries.
Contrast these types of sales with a scenario in which the conveyance of a useful product may be
unclear, such as a situation in which a party sells a used product to another party for salvage or
reprocessing. See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Association of Defense Counsel in Support of
Petitioner Shell Oil Company at 17 n.11, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599 (2009) (No. 07-1601).
16
See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–55 (4th Cir. 2015); NCR
Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2014); Team Enters., LLC v. W.
Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 907–09 (9th Cir. 2011).
17
See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 683–84 (3d Cir. 2003);
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); JonesHamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc. 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
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in part by the types of materials that recent courts have found to be useful
products. Before Burlington Northern, courts found the sales of styrene for
reprocessing18 and lead slag for lead reclamation19 to be arrangements for
disposal, while after Burlington Northern, courts found the sales of used
transformers,20 buildings contaminated with carcinogens,21 and scraps of
carbonless copy paper22 to be sales of useful products.
The recent changes in the application of the useful product doctrine
are indicative of a fundamental shift that has occurred in favor of
defendants. Historically, CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme,
coupled with low thresholds for finding liability across the four broad
classes of PRPs, have led to the popular belief that CERCLA is a proplaintiff statute that penalizes anyone caught in its net.23 Parties who suffer
the misfortune of getting caught in the net must then pursue an equitable
outcome in later actions for contribution or apportionment of harm.24
However, the recent changes in the useful product cases indicate that, in
this area, courts are limiting how widely the net can be cast. In particular,
courts are considering a broad range of circumstantial evidence and moving
away from the traditional strict liability approach that was used in the cases
preceding Burlington Northern.25
Going beyond Burlington Northern, courts are requiring the plaintiffs
to do more to prove that an arranger intended to dispose of waste, as
opposed to sell a useful product. While CERCLA places the burden on the
defendant PRP to raise the useful product defense,26 in practice, courts
insist that the plaintiff conclusively prove that the material disposed of was
not a useful product.27 In this way, courts are transforming CERCLA from
a “liability at any cost” statute to a scheme under which arranging entities
18

Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566.
Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2007).
20
Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d at 153–54.
21
United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that the contaminated
buildings could be considered useful).
22
NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 707 (7th Cir. 2014).
23
See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1446 (1997)
(“Criticisms of CERCLA as substantively inequitable, harsh, or unfair fill the reported cases.”).
24
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f)(1) (2012).
25
See Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d at 153–54; NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 705–07; United States v.
General Electric Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385–86 (1st Cir. 2012); Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western
Investment Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2011), for case examples of courts’ use of
a more holistic approach to the useful product doctrine.
26
Courts characterize the useful product doctrine as a defense, implying that the defendant bears
the burden of both asserting and proving the useful product doctrine to escape arranger liability. See,
e.g., Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 436 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
27
See infra Part II.
19
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need little more than a plausible story of their intent in order to escape
liability. By using circumstantial evidence to move away from strict
liability, courts are subverting the statute and bringing it back to its
common law roots, where stringent causation requirements allow
defendants to get off scot-free.
The consequences of this shift may be more far-reaching than most
observers have previously recognized. While the burden of proving the
useful product defense officially rests with the defendant PRP, the
increased costs and risks of litigation introduced by the changes in case law
may discourage the EPA from pursuing cases under this doctrine. This
could lead to a decline in Superfund litigation and ultimately impact the
pace of cleanup efforts across the country, threatening both human and
environmental health.
There is some evidence that this change in judicial application of the
useful product doctrine can be linked to a larger trend in administrative
law. Following United States v. Mead Corp., courts have been less
deferential to agency actions that occur outside of formal contexts (i.e.,
without formal adjudication or notice and comment).28 The changes in the
useful product doctrine mirror the trend set by Mead. The cases prior to
Burlington Northern, with their narrow application of the doctrine, show
courts’ willingness to embrace the EPA’s liability determination.29 More
recent cases, with courts’ broadened application of the doctrine and their
inclination to allow arrangers to escape from the CERCLA liability net,
show a lack of willingness to have the EPA’s finding of liability influence
the outcome of courts’ decisionmaking.
This Note analyzes the shift away from liability under the useful
product doctrine, shows that this shift will have a dampening effect on
litigation in the Superfund world, and correlates this shift with the changes
in wider administrative law. In Part I, this Note explores the evolution of
CERCLA arranger liability, from the statutory basis to the cases preceding
Burlington Northern, that reflected the courts’ tendency to narrowly apply
the useful product doctrine where there was an arrangement for disposal.
Part II investigates the modern useful product case law and demonstrates
how these cases have expanded upon Burlington Northern to shift away
from a punitive statutory focus to a broader application of the doctrine. Part
28

See 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
This liability finding, the Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO), requires parties to undertake a
short-term or long-term cleanup of a contaminated site, and is not developed in the context of noticeand-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. See Superfund Unilateral Orders, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-unilateral-orders [https://perma.cc/757V-BVHW] (last
updated Jan. 5, 2016).
29

720

111:715 (2017)

Going in CERCLAs

III explores the negative impact this shift will have on the Superfund world
and on the environment. Finally, Part IV theorizes that the change in the
application of the doctrine can be connected to a larger trend in
administrative law in which modern courts are less likely to defer to
informal agency findings and posits that courts should return to a more
deferential standard.
I.

THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF CERCLA ARRANGER LIABILITY

This Part will provide an overview of CERCLA arranger liability,
focusing on its statutory foundations and interpretive case law. It will start
by looking directly at the statute to understand what elements must be
proven for liability to attach. It will then explore useful product cases prior
to Burlington Northern, addressing three themes that exemplify how the
courts’ narrow application of the useful product doctrine historically
imposed broad liability on arrangers. Finally, this Part will identify
Burlington Northern as the turning point in arranger liability, after which
courts began to more generously apply the useful product doctrine and
more narrowly impose liability.
A.

A Brief Introduction to CERCLA Liability and § 107(a)(3)

Congress passed CERCLA30 in 1980 in response to increasingly
problematic releases of hazardous substances into the environment,31
intending to protect both human and environmental health from any actual
or threatened releases of pollutants.32 Congress designed CERCLA as a
broad, strict liability statute to ensure that the costs of responding to any
release of hazardous substances would be shouldered by those parties

30

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2012).
31
In 1978, an investigation at Love Canal, New York found that houses located on a former
hazardous waste site were contaminated and residents were experiencing health issues including “birth
defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormalities, sores, rectal bleeding, and headaches.” David W.
Lannetti, Note, “Arranger Liability” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 279, 281–82, 282 n.8 (1998).
32
See, e.g., § 9604(a) (allowing the President to respond to releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances or contaminants that might be of substantial or imminent harm to public welfare
or the environment).
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responsible for said release.33 Liability under CERCLA has often been
summarized as “the polluter pays.”34
Four prongs must be met for a party to be liable under CERCLA.
First, there must be a “release” or “substantial threat” of a release.35 In
keeping with the broad nature of CERCLA liability, release is expansively
defined, including all active emissions (discharging, spilling, and dumping)
as well as more passive emissions (leaking or abandonment of waste that
leaches into the ground).36 The second prong requires that the release be of
a “hazardous substance.”37 This is also broadly defined. It includes
hazardous substances specifically designated in CERCLA, as well as
hazardous substances so designated by the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air
Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act.38
The third prong is met if the release of the hazardous substance comes from
a “facility.”39 A facility is generously defined and includes “any site or area
where a hazardous substance has . . . come to be located.”40 Finally, a party
who meets the first three prongs of CERCLA liability must also belong to
one of the four categories of PRPs: (1) current owners and operators, (2)
owners and operators at the time of disposal, (3) persons who “arranged for
disposal or treatment” of hazardous substances, or (4) persons who
transported hazardous substances for treatment or disposal.41
This Note focuses exclusively on PRPs who qualify as arrangers.
Section 107(a)(3) speaks directly to arranger liability, imposing
responsibility on any party who “arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of
hazardous substances.”42 “Disposal” in the arranger context is broadly
defined and includes “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste” such that the
33

S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980) (“[T]hose responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or
injury from [a hazardous release] bear the costs of their actions.”).
34
E.g., Braunson Virjee, Stimulating the Future of Superfund: Why the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act Calls for a Reinstatement of the Superfund Tax to Polluted Sites in Urban
Environments, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2010, at 27.
35
§ 9604(a)(1).
36
Id. § 9601(22) (“The term ‘release’ means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . . .”).
37
Id. § 9607(a)(4).
38
Id. §§ 9601(14), 9602.
39
Id. § 9607(a).
40
Id. § 9601(9).
41
Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
42
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 107(a)(3),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)) (2012).
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waste might reach the environment.43 Disposal can be either active
(dumping, spilling, discharging, placing) or passive (leaking).44 While
“arranged for” is not statutorily defined, in keeping with the broad nature of
CERCLA liability, courts have traditionally construed it liberally, as will
be discussed further in the next Section.
B.

The Useful Product Doctrine Pre-Burlington Northern

The useful product doctrine is a judicially created exception to
arranger liability in cases where the transfer of a hazardous substance
served a purpose other than disposal.45 While the useful product doctrine
narrowed arranger liability in some cases,46 prior to Burlington Northern, it
was successfully invoked by litigants and applied by courts in very narrow
circumstances. This Section will explore the circumstances under which the
useful product doctrine was effectively invoked prior to Burlington
Northern. It will focus on three themes: (1) the distinction between virgin
and secondary products, (2) the emphasis on original utility, and (3) the
low threshold for knowledge and intent. Before Burlington Northern,
courts across circuits favored virgin materials as useful products,
emphasized that materials must retain their original use to be useful
products, and required only general knowledge of the possibility of
contamination stemming from the sale of a useful product to prove liability.

43

Id. § 6903(3). “Disposal” is defined in relation to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Id. § 9601(29).
Tommy Tucker Henson II, What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been: Broader Arranger Liability in
the Ninth Circuit and Rethinking the Useful Product Doctrine, 38 ENVTL. L. 941, 944–45 (2008).
45
The Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA), an amendment to CERCLA, serves a similar
purpose to the useful product doctrine. It states:
44

[A] person who arranged for recycling of recyclable material shall not be liable under
sections 9607(a)(3) and 9607(a)(4) of this title with respect to such material. . . . [T]he term
‘recyclable material’ means . . . scrap metal, or spent lead-acid . . . batteries, as well as minor
amounts of material incident to or adhering to the scrap material as a result of its normal and
customary use prior to becoming scrap.
§ 9627. This statutory provision provides what is generally referred to as the recycling exemption. The
burden of proof is on the entity to establish that it is shielded from CERCLA liability by the recycling
exemption defense. See EPA, SUPERFUND RECYCLING EQUITY ACT OF 1999: FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN
A CERCLA ENFORCEMENT CASE 1 (2002), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/sreaguide-1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6RC-RDKX].
46
It is presumed that entities or persons selling useful products are doing so for legitimate reasons
while entities selling wholly hazardous waste materials are more likely to be doing so to get rid of the
waste and may be trying to disguise the transfer in such a way that would shield them from arranger
liability. See Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). The
doctrine shields the transferor from liability in cases where environmental contamination occurs as a
result of the transferee’s independent use of the hazardous substance. It is a crucial limitation for parties
who are legitimately transferring materials with hazardous components while attempting to serve a
beneficial purpose. See Henson, supra note 44, at 955.
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1. Virgin vs. Secondary Materials.—Before Burlington Northern,
courts drew a sharp distinction between virgin and secondary materials.
Virgin materials, products that are manufactured to be used in their current
state,47 were nearly always considered useful products. In 3550 Stevens
Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California, for example, the Ninth
Circuit exempted a contractor who engaged in asbestos remediation from
liability in the sale of a hazardous substance that was later disposed of after
it was used as intended.48 The court stated, “there is no meaningful
difference for purposes of CERCLA between a party who sells or
transports a [virgin] product containing or composed of hazardous
substances for a productive use, and a party who actually puts that product
to its constructive use . . . .”49 Thus, neither the transfer of the virgin
material nor the productive use of the virgin material was considered a
disposal.50 As a matter of simple logic, it makes sense that a product being
sold in its original state for its intended use would be exempted from
arranger liability via the useful product doctrine. Entities involved in the
sale of virgin materials are most likely not trying to disguise a disposal of a
hazardous material; rather they are engaging in a legitimate business
relationship—the sale of a useful product—that will have a beneficial
impact on the economy.51
While the exemption of virgin materials is fairly straightforward,
courts have traditionally treated secondary materials very differently.
Secondary materials can be products like lead slag and dross that contain a
small percentage of reclaimable constituents,52 products like spent styrene
contaminated with hazardous substances that must be removed before use,53
or products like copper slag that generally require disposal but can be sold
for some other use, like ballast in a log yard.54 Historically, the distinction
between virgin and secondary products was reasonable: while
manufacturers of virgin products are selling a new and beneficial material,
47

Id. at 949.
915 F.2d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
49
Id. at 1362.
50
Id.
51
See Team Enters., 647 F.3d at 908.
52
Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting slag and dross resulting from lead smelting operations contain a minority percentage of useful
lead, and in this case were sold to a lead smelter for lead reclamation).
53
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(discussing the transfer of spent styrene back to the manufacturer for removal of contaminants to return
the styrene to its virgin state).
54
See La.–Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1570–71 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing how
logging companies would purchase copper slag to lay on the ground as a “ballast,” which eased
operations by making the ground firmer).
48
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there is the real possibility that producers of secondary materials are trying
to dispose of otherwise only nominally useful waste products.55 Moreover,
secondary materials, unlike virgin materials, often contain both reclaimable
materials and waste products.56 These waste products, most often the
unwanted consequence of a manufacturing process, must be disposed of in
one manner or another.57 If contamination occurred in the course of
attempting to offload waste, the producer of the secondary material should
be held responsible, consistent with CERCLA’s broad liability scheme.58
Generally, courts relied on CERCLA’s broad definitions of waste and
disposal to draw a distinction between waste material and useful products.59
Courts disregarded the fact that the processing of a secondary material
might lead to the reclamation of valuable constituents.60 In California
Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., for example,
slag and dross, byproducts of a manufacturing process, were sold to a lead
smelter so the smelter could reclaim the valuable lead inside.61 Despite the
fact that this transaction would directly lead to the generation of a useful
virgin material, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the
defendants] sold the by-products of their manufacturing processes
primarily for treatment and disposal purposes.”62
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts were generally skeptical of any
arrangement that did not on its face appear to be a straightforward sale of a
useful product. A clear example is State of New York v. General Electric
Co., where the court found that CERCLA liability could not be “facilely
circumvented” by characterizing arrangements to dispose of a secondary
material as sales, and that “persons cannot escape liability by ‘contracting
away’ their responsibility or by alleging that the incident was caused by the
act or omission of a third party.”63 The threshold for arranger liability for
those who had transferred a secondary material was quite low. As a result,

55

Henson, supra note 44, at 950.
Id.
57
Id.
58
See id.
59
See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“A person may be held liable as an ‘arranger’ under § 9607(a)(3) only if the material in question
constitutes ‘waste’ rather than a ‘useful product.’” (first quoting A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v.
Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); and then quoting Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States,
34 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1994)).
60
See Henson, supra note 44, at 949–50.
61
508 F.3d at 932.
62
Id. at 939.
63
592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 31 (1980)).
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courts’ broad interpretation of arranger liability prior to Burlington
Northern ensured that almost any sale of a secondary material was an
arrangement for disposal.
2. Utility: Original Use.—Courts also considered whether a material
had retained its original utility in determining whether a party could escape
arranger liability. This analysis often overlaps with the distinction between
secondary and virgin materials, as virgin materials can clearly be used as
intended and secondary materials generally cannot. In Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., the Eleventh Circuit considered whether
a manufacturer can be held liable for their original sale of transformers,
after the original purchaser subsequently resold the transformers as scrap to
a third party.64 The court found that the manufacturer was not liable for the
initial sale of the new, useful transformers but suggested that there could be
liability in the subsequent sale of the used transformers as scrap because
these used transformers no longer retained their original utility.65 The court
declined to create a per se rule that a seller of an arguably useful product
can never be an arranger, asserting that this would “frustrate CERCLA’s
broad remedial purpose” and “be contrary to prevailing case law.”66
In keeping with the emphasis on original utility, courts also excluded
from liability secondary materials that had a small percentage of hazardous
substances that had to be removed for original use to be restored.67 Entities
that engaged in transactions in which contaminated materials were passed
off for processing were found to be arranging for disposal. For example,
the Ninth Circuit in Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. United States
reversed summary judgment to the defendant PRP and determined that the
trier of fact could conclude that the sale of contaminated styrene, a
chemical used in rubber, to a third party for processing was an arrangement
for disposal.68 The court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the
styrene could return to its virgin state, could still be used for its original
purpose, and caused minimal environmental damage.69
3. Intent, Knowledge, and Control (or Lack Thereof).—As part of an
inquiry into whether a possible arranger intended to dispose of a material,
courts examined whether a party had knowledge of a possible disposal or
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893 F.2d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 1990).
See id. at 1316–19.
66
Id. at 1318.
67
See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
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Id. at 565–66.
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See id. at 564.
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control over said disposal. Pre-Burlington Northern, general knowledge of
the possibility of contamination was all that courts required in order to
prove arranger liability.70 While there are circumstances where an entity
can have knowledge without intent or vice versa, typically knowledge of
disposal and intent to dispose went hand in hand.71 If no evidence of actual
knowledge or intent to dispose existed, courts were comfortable relying on
circumstantial evidence to impute knowledge or intent to a party. For
example, if a process typically resulted in hazardous contamination of the
environment, courts were comfortable inferring both intent and knowledge
from those factual circumstances.72 The Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Cello-Foil Products, Inc. stated that “intent need not be proven by direct
evidence, but can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances” when
evaluating arranger liability.73 The Third Circuit in Morton International,
Inc. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. similarly adhered to a loose “general
knowledge” standard in proving intent to dispose, stating that “general
knowledge that waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable part of the
process arranged for by the defendant may suffice to establish liability.”74
The court concluded the defendant likely had knowledge of the possibility
of environmental hazards related to mercury processing, given its use of
mercury at its own plant.75
Courts consistently rejected defendants’ assertions that they cannot be
held liable because they lacked control over the contamination; a lack of
control posed no bar to liability. If an entity owned a substance during the
waste-generating process and demonstrated some measure of knowledge
that a third party was likely to dispose of the material, they were often
found liable even if they had no control over the contamination. In United
States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., the Eighth Circuit found that
a pesticide company could be liable for spills perpetrated by a formulating
company to which the pesticide company had supplied pesticides for
processing.76 Despite the fact that the spills were entirely caused by the
formulating company, the court rejected the pesticide company’s claim that
they did not intend to dispose of waste and were only passing on a useful
70

See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003).
See Henson, supra note 44, at 951 (“Intent and knowledge involve highly subjective analyses
into the actions of the alleged arranger and circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine
whether the transaction is an arrangement for disposal, and these two factors are used somewhat
interchangeably.”).
72
Id. at 951–52.
73
100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996).
74
Morton, 343 F.3d at 678.
75
Id. at 682.
76
872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
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product for processing.77 The court noted that such a limited reading of the
doctrine would frustrate “CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ statutory
scheme.”78 Other circuits came to similar conclusions, finding defendants
liable despite their complete lack of control over the actual contamination.79
This is similar to courts’ emphasis on materials retaining their original use
in order to be useful products and requiring only general knowledge of the
possibility of contamination stemming from the sale of a useful product to
prove liability.
C.

Burlington Northern: The Beginning of a New Narrative

Burlington Northern represents a sea change in arranger liability and
in CERCLA jurisprudence generally.80 The case involved an agricultural
chemical business, Brown & Bryant Inc. (B&B), that operated a chemical
storage facility adjacent to land owned by two railroads.81 As part of this
storage business, B&B contracted with Shell for bulk shipping of
pesticides, including the pesticide D-D, which spilled during delivery and
contaminated the adjacent parcel of land owned by the railroads.82 Despite
the role Shell played in the ultimate contamination of the parcel of land, the
Supreme Court found that Shell was not liable as an arranger.83
The case raised the threshold of proving arranger liability.84 Where it
had once been an easy proposition for courts and plaintiffs to establish
arranger liability,85 liability after Burlington Northern requires much more
substantial proof of wrongdoing. In particular, Burlington Northern
transformed the intent standard: simple evidence of a party’s knowledge of
potential environmental contamination was no longer enough to infer intent
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Id. at 1380.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986)).
79
See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the entity who owned raw materials arranged for disposal of toxic substances when they
supplied toxic materials to a third-party formulator for processing that later ended up contaminating the
environment, despite the fact that complete control was ceded to the formulator).
80
See Brown, supra note 10, at 507.
81
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602–03 (2009).
82
Id. at 603–04.
83
Id. at 619.
84
See Jon-Erik W. Magnus, Comment, Lyon’s Roar, Then a Whimper: The Demise of Broad
Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Burlington Northern,
3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 428 (2010) (“The consequence of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Burlington Northern is a collective sigh of relief from products manufacturers that would have
otherwise been subjected to the broad theory of arranger liability . . . .”).
85
See supra Section I.B.
78
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and trigger arranger liability.86 The Court stated that “[i]n order to qualify
as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale . . . with the intention
that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer
process.”87 The intent standard shifted from a general knowledge threshold
to one of specific intent to dispose of hazardous substances within the
transaction.88
As part of the intent inquiry, the Court also considered the
precautionary efforts that Shell had taken to prevent spills.89 While circuit
court precedent provided that circumstantial evidence could be used in
making the determination of whether a transaction constituted the sale of a
useful product,90 Burlington Northern transformed how circumstantial
evidence was used. The Court used circumstantial evidence to look beyond
the nature of the transaction to understand the more holistic actions of the
potential arranger. It pointed to the fact that Shell had taken precautions
against spills, which included providing its distributors with safety manuals
and offering discounts if they took certain safety precautions.91
Significantly, this is an expansion of the use of circumstantial evidence to
include general exculpatory information, as opposed to the use of
circumstantial evidence that presumed that the entity was at fault.92
Ultimately, Burlington Northern was a significant blow to productsbased CERCLA liability. Prior to Burlington Northern, it was possible for
PRPs to pursue a contribution action against any product manufacturer that
had generated a secondary product that had ultimately contaminated the
environment.93 Where a secondary material ultimately contaminated the
environment, courts relied on their past orientation towards broad liability
86

The Court cautioned that “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity ‘planned for’
the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an
unused, useful product.” Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 612; see also Lawrence, supra note 15, at
49–50 (“The Burlington Northern opinion adds a clear ‘intent-to-dispose’ requirement for courts to find
a party liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3).”).
87
Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
88
See Brown, supra note 10, at 508 (“The Court’s holding indicates a dramatic change from
previous decisions where plaintiffs were once able to impose strict liability against defendants under
CERCLA who had no actual knowledge of the illegal disposal.”).
89
Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 613; see Walewska Watkins, Note, Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States: The Supreme Court Arranges for Disposal of CERCLA’s Strict
Liability, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 215 (2009).
90
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
91
Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 613.
92
Recall the general knowledge standard established in cases prior to Burlington Northern in
which courts required only evidence of general knowledge of the possibility of contamination for
liability to attach. See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir.
2003); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
93
Magnus, supra note 84, at 452.
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to resolve issues within the liability penumbra.94 If courts sensed any gaps
in CERCLA liability, they pointed to the statutory emphasis on ensuring
that all parties were held responsible for cleanup.95 However, by requiring
clear intent to dispose, the Court in Burlington Northern shifted away from
this presumption of broad liability to a more permissive approach that
allowed Shell, a party that may have previously been caught in the arranger
liability net, to escape fault.96
While Burlington Northern did change the intent inquiry by making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish the requisite intent necessary to
impose arranger liability, it did not conclusively establish how the intent
analysis should be completed by the lower courts.97 The case required more
substantial evidence of wrongdoing beyond mere knowledge and
considered some exculpatory circumstantial evidence in assigning arranger
liability but it did not draw bright lines as to what factors exactly should be
weighed in the arranger liability inquiry. Following Burlington Northern,
lower courts took advantage of the gaps in the case to develop an even
more lenient approach to the useful product doctrine, as will be discussed
in the following Part.
II.

SHIFTING USE OF THE DOCTRINE

Following the Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, the useful
product doctrine has become an increasingly effective defensive tool for
PRPs who are seeking to escape arranger liability. Lower courts have
expanded upon the transformation of the intent standard laid out in
Burlington Northern in order to dramatically narrow liability for arrangers
under the useful product doctrine.
This Part will return to the three themes examined in Part I and show
how these themes narrowed arranger liability. On the first theme, the
distinction between virgin and secondary products, courts have become

94

See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled on other
grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
95
See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1990)
(finding that a per se rule absolving manufacturers of liability would “frustrate CERCLA’s broad
remedial purpose”).
96
556 U.S. at 613. This foreshadows the shift that occurred in the useful product doctrine, as will
be discussed in Part II.
97
See Heidi Rasmussen, Re-“Arranging” CERCLA Liability: What Is the State of Arranger
Liability Post-Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States?, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J.
381, 382 (2015) (“Scholars and potential arrangers hoped that Burlington Northern would provide
much-needed clarification for the unique category of CERCLA arranger liability. Unfortunately,
regarding arranger liability specifically, some scholars indicate that, even after Burlington Northern,
there is still a need for clarification.”).
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much more willing to accept secondary products as useful products.98 On
the second theme, the requirement of original utility, courts have
determined that materials no longer need to retain their full original utility
to be considered useful products.99 On the third theme, intent, courts have
established a higher standard to prove intent, emphasizing control over the
material and direct knowledge of disposal.100 Finally, this Part will consider
the fact that courts have become increasingly willing to consider
circumstantial evidence to fill evidentiary gaps in favor of the defendant
PRPs.101 This Part will conclude with a reflection on how this shift indicates
a subversion of the values of the statute as a whole, from punitive to more
permissive, moving the statute back to its common law roots.
A.

Secondary Products: Neither New nor Useful

Prior to Burlington Northern, courts drew a hard line between virgin
and secondary products. Virgin products were generally considered useful
products102 while secondary products were rarely considered as such, even
in light of evidence of their utility.103 However, since Burlington Northern,
despite the fact that the Court did not speak directly to this issue, lower
courts have softened their approach to secondary products, such that today,
there is no longer a hard and fast distinction between virgin and secondary
materials in the useful product realm. For example, the Seventh Circuit
found that a secondary byproduct of the paper milling process was
considered a useful product even though it was not a virgin product.104 The
Fourth Circuit similarly found that used transformers were considered a
useful product despite the fact that they were a secondary product and not a
virgin material.105 The Eighth Circuit also found that buildings
contaminated with toxic chemicals could be a useful product even though
they were decisively not a virgin material.106
This dissolution of the distinction between secondary and virgin
products has gone hand in hand with a loosening or outright abandonment
of the original utility requirement. Courts prior to Burlington Northern
98

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.A.
100
See infra Section II.B.
101
See infra Section II.C.
102
See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir.
1990).
103
See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir.
2007); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
104
NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 705–07 (7th Cir. 2014).
105
See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015).
106
See United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015).
99
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emphasized the need for materials to retain their original utility in order for
them to meet the useful product standard.107 By contrast, recent decisions
have allowed potential arrangers to invoke the useful product doctrine in
instances where a material was conclusively unusable for its original
purpose. In NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., the Seventh
Circuit asserted that a material does not need to retain its original utility to
be considered useful.108 The court emphasized the fact that the material,
despite the fact that it was not useful for its original purpose as carbonless
copy paper, was indeed useful because it was an essential input for the
purchaser’s process as recyclable fiber.109 The court, unlike its predecessors
that excluded secondary materials that were contaminated with a minority
percentage of a hazardous substance,110 overlooked the hazardous nature of
the secondary byproduct and focused instead on the material’s utility.111
The Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,
similarly considered “the usefulness of the materials in the condition in
which they were sold” to support a finding that the defendant did not
arrange for disposal.112
Recent courts, by opening the door to secondary products that do not
retain their original utility, have widened the range of scenarios in which
the useful product doctrine can be effectively raised and, consequently,
have made it easier for defendant PRPs to escape arranger liability even in
cases where a secondary product has clearly contaminated the
environment.113 This more lenient approach to secondary materials is not a
case of courts wanting to incentivize recycling because there is already a
statutory section specifically dealing with exempting recycling from
CERCLA liability.114
B.

Higher Standard for Proving Intent

In addition to changing the utility standard and opening up the
possibility of secondary materials qualifying as useful products, courts
107

See Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566.
768 F.3d at 707.
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566.
111
See NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 707.
112
781 F.3d 129, 153–55 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville
& Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998)).
113
See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 351 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing summary
judgment on the issue of arranger liability for a company that had sold buildings with large amounts of
toxic PCB insulation that had contaminated the environment, because while the buildings were largely
worthless and contaminated, some parts were still useful).
114
For more information on the Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA), see supra note 45.
108
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have also raised the standard for proving intent to dispose, making it easier
for defendant PRPs to invoke the useful product doctrine.115 While
Burlington Northern required a heightened intent inquiry, courts have gone
beyond the Court’s requirements in the useful product arena. The recent
useful product decisions have emphasized that control over disposal is a
critical element in proving intent to dispose and thus in proving arranger
liability—a drastic change from the pre-Burlington Northern jurisprudence.
In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit found that the appellee was not
an arranger in part because it “lacked knowledge of or control over what
[the buyer] chose to do with the transformers [it] acquired.”116 In Team
Enterprises, LLC v. Western Investment Real Estate Trust, the Ninth
Circuit similarly found that the manufacturer did not exercise sufficient
control over the operator’s disposal process such that it could be liable as
an arranger.117 This is in direct contrast to the pre-Burlington Northern
cases where mere knowledge of the possibility of disposal was enough to
prove intent to arrange for disposal.118
In addition to the emphasis on control, courts have also stated that
specific knowledge of disposal is needed in order to prove arranger
liability.119 By requiring direct knowledge of disposal, something not
specifically required by the Court in Burlington Northern, lower courts
have stretched Burlington Northern beyond its holding.120 Unlike earlier
courts that were satisfied with evidence of the PRP’s general knowledge of
the possibility of contamination to prove intent to dispose, recent courts
have raised this standard, stating that more than general knowledge is
needed to prove intent. Demonstrative of this trend, the Seventh Circuit in
NCR Corp. held that the appellant’s mere indifference to the fact that the
byproduct could be released into the environment was not enough to show
intent to dispose, and therefore, insufficient to prove arranger liability.121
115

Courts have made it clear that intent is a requisite part of being liable as an arranger. See United
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“Whatever else
‘otherwise arranged for disposal’ means . . . it does not apply to situations where there was no intent to
dispose of a hazardous substance.”), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
116
781 F.3d at 152.
117
647 F.3d 901, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2011).
118
See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[G]eneral
knowledge that waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable part of the process arranged for by the
defendant may suffice to establish liability.”).
119
See NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 706 (7th Cir. 2014); Team
Enters., 647 F.3d at 908–09.
120
While the Court found that “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity ‘planned for’
the disposal,” it did not require specific knowledge of the buyer’s disposal plans in order to impose
arranger liability. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 612 (2009).
121
768 F.3d at 706–07.
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Similarly, in Team Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit found that actions taken
with the mere knowledge of future disposal were not enough to show intent
to dispose.122 The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Burlington Northern, asserted
that, “[w]hile actions taken with the intent to dispose of a hazardous
substance are sufficient for arranger liability, actions taken with the mere
knowledge of such future disposal are not.”123 This emphasis on both
control and specific knowledge of disposal raises the standard for proving
intent to dispose such that it is easier for defendant arrangers to invoke the
useful product doctrine and evade arranger liability.124
C.

Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Show Intent

Recent cases have also demonstrated an increasing willingness to use
circumstantial evidence to satisfy the useful product exemption. Often,
circumstantial evidence is the only evidence available. Because of the long
and complicated histories of many CERCLA useful product cases, there are
often evidentiary gaps regarding key issues such as intent.125 Accordingly,
and playing on the Burlington Northern idea that the broader circumstances
of the transaction can be considered, courts have expanded their analysis of
the useful product exemption to consider a holistic view of the transaction.
As part of this shift, two categories of circumstantial evidence have been
used to prove arrangement for disposal, both of which will be examined
here: management of the material prior to sale and the value of the
material.
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647 F.3d at 908–09.
Id. at 908 (citing Burlington Northern, 556 U.S at 612).
124
The court in United States v. Dico, Inc. went a step further, indicating that a party could escape
arranger liability even if it demonstrated intent to dispose. 808 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A party
may sell a still ‘useful’ product, i.e., fit either for its intended purpose or some other purpose useful to
the buyer, with the full intention to rid itself of environmental liability rather than a legitimate sale, for
example where the cost of disposal or contamination remediation would greatly exceed its purchase
price (e.g., selling a working and useful piece of machinery for $10,000 that comes along with a
$100,000 price tag for remediation costs).”).
125
Superfund sites have long histories. Many cleanups take decades. See Financial Assurance,
Bonding and CERCLA 108b, EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/financial
_assurance_bonding_and_cercla_108b#.VpfFsJMrKT8 [https://perma.cc/8X8B-3K4V] (citing an EPA
report stating that 59% of contaminated mining sites need around forty years of cleanup efforts).
Contamination may have occurred far before the problem was detected for liability purposes. For
example, the Fox River was contaminated in the 1950s, PCBs in the sediment were detected in the
1980s, and a cleanup plan was not proposed until 2001. See WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. & EPA,
PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN: LOWER FOX RIVER AND GREEN BAY 6 (2001),
http://www3.epa.gov/region5/cleanup/foxriver/pdfs/proposed_plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQ8DDBTN]. As of 2016, the cleanup was still ongoing. See Lower Fox River, supra note 3. Because of this,
documents showing a party’s specific involvement with a contaminated site may be old or incomplete.
Witnesses similarly may be difficult to locate or even deceased.
123
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Courts have considered how the defendant PRP managed the material
at issue before selling it to the party that contaminated the environment. If
the material was carefully handled prior to the sale, courts tend to view this
as evidence that there was no intent to dispose.126 On the other hand, if the
material was treated more like waste prior to sale, this treatment indicates
that there likely was intent to dispose.127 The Fourth Circuit in
Consolidation Coal considered the management of used transformers prior
to sale to indicate that the appellee had sold a useful product.128 The court
found that the transformers had been carefully handled because they had
been largely drained of PCB-laden oil and had been capped during
transfer.129 In reality, there are many other reasons for the appellee’s
actions. Capping and draining could indicate that the PRP wanted to avoid
contamination prior to or during transfer, for which they could be liable
under CERCLA.130 Although the fact that the appellee carefully handled the
transformers does not entirely indicate that the transformers are useful
products, this use of circumstantial evidence is in keeping with the courts’
willingness to take a more expansive view of the useful product doctrine.
Courts have also used this circumstantial factor to find intent to
dispose, but in those cases, courts required the treatment of the material to
clearly indicate that a disposal was occurring. For example, in United
States v. General Electric Co., the First Circuit found that drums of scrap
chemicals were treated so poorly prior to sale that they could not construe
this management as anything but intent to dispose.131 They pointed to the
fact that the drums were stored in a salvage yard and that no quality control
measures whatsoever were taken to ensure the continued integrity of the
chemicals.132
Beyond the treatment of material, courts have also looked at the value
of the material to determine whether there was a sale of a useful product or
whether the transaction was simply a disposal. As part of this analysis,
courts have considered the price at which the material was sold, whether
multiple buyers were considered, and how the materials were valued by the
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See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015).
See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385–86 (1st Cir. 2012).
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781 F.3d at 153–54.
129
Id. at 154.
130
If the contamination had occurred prior to transfer, they could be liable as an owner or operator;
if it occurred during transfer, they could be liable as a transporter under the statute. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2012).
131
670 F.3d at 385–86.
132
Id.
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seller prior to the sale.133 The Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal found
that the transformers at issue had an “unquestionably positive commercial
value,” demonstrated by the fact that both the seller and buyer profited
from the sale.134 The seller recovered revenue beyond the scrap value of the
transformer and the buyer resold some of the transformers for a profit.135
Furthermore, there was a viable market for the transformers as they were
sold at a competitive auction, with multiple buyers participating.136 The
Seventh Circuit in NCR Corp. similarly used evidence of the byproduct’s
value to find no arranger liability.137 The appellant had invested resources
in processing the byproduct before sale, and then placed the byproduct into
a competitive market in an attempt to recoup some of the production costs
expended in preparing the byproduct.138 The competitive pricing and viable
market demonstrated the value of the byproduct, which supported the
court’s conclusion that this was the sale of a useful product.139
Courts’ willingness to read intent into this evidence about the value of
the product is a significant departure from the pre-Burlington Northern
courts that ended the intent inquiry after finding knowledge of the mere
possibility of contamination occurring as the result of the sale of the
material.140 Moreover, it shows that recent courts have become increasingly
keen to open up the scope of the inquiry to facilitate the successful use of
the useful product doctrine. In reality, however, the fact that the seller made
some marginal profit in no way conclusively means they were not
disposing of the materials.
There have been cases in which the value of the material at issue has
swung the pendulum the other way and indicated that the material was not
a useful product. In General Electric, the First Circuit found GE to be
liable as an arranger where circumstantial evidence indicated that the scrap
chemicals at issue completely lacked value.141 The court examined whether
the materials had been advertised to multiple buyers, whether there was a
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United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 360 (8th Cir. 2015) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d at 385–86.
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781 F.3d at 152–53.
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Id.
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Id. at 152.
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768 F.3d 682, 704–07 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 704–05.
139
Id. at 704–07.
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Compare Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying
a loose general knowledge standard for arranger liability), with NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 706 (stating that
the appellant’s indifference to the fact that the byproduct could be released into the environment was
not enough to show intent to dispose).
141
670 F.3d 377, 384–85 (1st Cir. 2012).
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general demand, and whether the chemicals had been competitively
priced.142 It was only after finding that the material had no value that the
court found arranger liability.143 The court’s willingness to even entertain
these peripheral issues shows a shift from a narrow inquiry around a useful
product to a more expansive one that makes it more difficult to impose
liability.
A court’s willingness to use circumstantial factors as part of the intent
inquiry shows the shift from a narrow use of the doctrine to a broader use,
where the standard moved from a question of whether a party knew or
should have known that a disposal would occur to an examination of
mitigating circumstances that show the transaction was a sale and not a
disposal. The lower courts expanded on the mandate laid out by the Court
in Burlington Northern to develop a permissive, pro-defendant approach to
the useful product doctrine.
D.

Shifting Doctrine and a Return to the Common Law

These changes in the doctrine indicate a subversion of the values of
the statute, as stated by Congress when CERCLA was passed. CERCLA
has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on broad, punitive liability.144
This emphasis on wide-reaching liability is consistent with the outcome of
the cases decided before Burlington Northern in which there was a heavy
burden on the defendant PRPs to demonstrate that the products at issue
were indeed useful.145 Courts pre-Burlington Northern did not consider
secondary products, even those with some demonstrated usefulness, to be
useful products, and the mere possibility of knowledge of disposal was
enough to prove intent to dispose. Justice Brennan in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co. expounded upon the broad liability standard that courts
embraced prior to Burlington Northern: “The remedy that Congress felt it
needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible
for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs
of cleanup.”146 Recent decisions have subverted this broad liability
standard, moving the statute back to its common law roots, where stringent
causation requirements allow defendants to escape liability.
142

The court found that none of these three things had occurred. See id. at 386.
See id. at 384–91.
144
See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) (“CERCLA, as a strict
liability statute . . . can be terribly unfair in certain instances in which parties may be required to pay
huge amounts for damages to which their acts did not contribute.”).
145
See cases cited supra note 17.
146
491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion). This case was overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), but this subsequent ruling dealt with the Eleventh Amendment issue and
was not a CERCLA case, so Justice Brennan’s language is still relevant.
143
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Criticism of CERCLA for this liability-at-any-cost standard can be
easily found in past cases.147 Since Burlington Northern, courts in the useful
product arena have relied on prior disapproval of CERCLA’s draconian
nature and have welcomed a more permissive approach, providing greater
leniency for defendants. Courts’ use of the intent element has had the
greatest impact on CERCLA liability. In doing so, courts may believe that
they are focusing on ensuring that the parties truly responsible for the worst
parts of the contamination are responsible for funding the cleanup and that
less directly responsible parties, like arrangers selling arguably useful
products, escape the liability net.
However, by imposing a much higher standard of intent, courts are
actively subverting the original intention of CERCLA to avoid liability
loopholes based on difficult-to-prove, subjective criteria.148 One of the
animating factors behind the major environmental statutes was the need to
develop causes of action that would serve as effective stand-ins for the
common law causes of action that courts had previously relied upon in the
environmental context.149 Claims of trespass, nuisance, and negligence
dominated early environmental cases.150 One of the main challenges of
using common law causes of action was establishing causation between the
harm and the defendant’s conduct.151 Given the complicated nature of
environmental contamination, direct causation was difficult to prove and
often depended on the amorphous notions of “fault” and “state of mind”

147

Nagle, supra note 23, at 1446 (“Criticisms of CERCLA as substantively inequitable, harsh, or
unfair fill the reported cases. . . . CERCLA’s imposition of strict, joint and several, and retroactive
liability without regard to causation has been the target of countless complaints.”).
148
See Lannetti, supra note 31, at 280 (arguing that CERCLA’s legislative history and the plain
language of the statute itself indicate that Congress intended to hold arrangers strictly liable).
149
See Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern
Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 149 (2015) (“The advent of
statutes changed [the common law] regime . . . . [T]he legislature intervened in order to set explicit
standards of conduct that major enterprises . . . had to comply with in order to undertake their activities.
There are all sorts of good reasons for imposing these statutory duties. The harms in question could be
quite serious and perhaps irreparable. The actors may not have the resources to pay damages. The
needed safeguards are easy to understand and in most cases to implement.”).
150
See COLL. OF AGRIC. & LIFE SCIS. AT N.C. STATE UNIV., COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIES 1, https://www.cals.ncsu.edu/course/are309b/Common_Law_Environmental_Remedies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J74H-HT6S].
151
Common law causes of action like nuisance that attempt to balance the interests of the two
parties face difficulty with environmental actions because the natural resources involved do not have a
market and therefore cannot be concretely valued. C.A. ULIBARRI & K.F. WELLMAN, NATURAL
RESOURCE VALUATION: A PRIMER ON CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 43 (1997),
http://www.environmentalmanager.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/valuation_primer_from_doe.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4KK-ETBJ] (“Natural resource and environmental valuation is difficult, even when
there is relative certainty over prevailing economic and environmental conditions.”).
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that were difficult to quantify and could be easily manipulated by the
parties.152
CERCLA set out to replace the unwieldy and ineffective common law
causes of action with something more concrete that could effectively
impose liability on parties that may not be directly tied to the
contamination but are nevertheless responsible in some manner.153 Instead
of direct causation, CERCLA only requires a party show that there is a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at a facility and that
the defendant falls into one of the four categories of liability.154 This
attenuated causation requirement was a response to the difficulties of
proving causation under common law. It widened the liability net to
include many parties who would not otherwise be liable under a common
law standard. While parties who fall outside the reach of common law may
argue that they are not directly responsible for releases, CERCLA
addressed the complexity and expense of cleanups and the need for all
players involved in a contamination to be on the hook for the cost.
CERCLA eschewed the constraints of common law causes of action and
provided the government and private parties with a more efficient
mechanism to facilitate cleanups and to recover costs associated with these
actions.155
Instead of upholding CERCLA’s purpose as a vehicle that can
facilitate cleanups and cost recovery by providing a concrete statutory
framework to impose liability on polluters, recent courts in the useful
product context have begun to reinsert common law elements of fault and
state of mind.156 In doing so, they are pulling CERCLA in the direction of

152

Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), reveals the difficulties with causation in early
common law cases. In this case, Missouri sued Illinois for dumping sewage into the Mississippi River
causing a typhoid outbreak. Id. at 523. However, Missouri could not effectively connect the increase in
deaths from typhoid in their state to Illinois’ dumping of sewage. Id. The Court was skeptical, pointing
to possible intervening causes and the lack of direct evidence connecting Illinois’s specific actions to
the outcome in Missouri. Id.
153
For example, CERCLA imposes liability on current owner/operators, even if they were not the
owner or operator at the time of the disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012).
154
Id.; see also Suzanne C. Baskin & Phillip D. Reed, “Arranging For Disposal” Under CERCLA:
When Is a Generator Liable?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10160, 10161 (1985) (“The government has won every
battle . . . on its theory that CERCLA requires only limited proof of causation.”).
155
See Alexandra B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law, and Federalism in the 21st Century, 41 SW. L.
REV. 679, 683 (2012).
156
Such considerations, however, should not matter under CERCLA. See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict
Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 635
(1993) (“CERCLA imposes strict liability; considerations of fault or blameworthiness are, by definition,
irrelevant under its terms.”).
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requiring proof of direct causation and away from the attenuated causation
scheme that Congress intended it to be.
III.

A REAL IMPACT: HOW THE SHIFT WILL AFFECT SUPERFUND

This shift away from broad liability in the useful product arena will
have a real impact on the landscape of Superfund litigation.157 This Part will
examine the impact that this shift will have on the major players in the
Superfund world: the PRPs, the EPA, and the environment. It will argue
that this shift conclusively favors defendant arranger PRPs, will have a
dampening effect on agency enforcement action, and a corresponding
negative effect on Superfund cleanup efforts, ultimately wreaking havoc on
human and environmental health.
PRPs who are being pursued as arrangers will now have the upper
hand in this area. PRPs being sought as owners or operators of
contaminated properties will be more reticent to pursue arrangers in
contribution actions given the changing landscape of useful product
litigation. Additionally, the EPA will be similarly wary when it comes to
backing these arranger liability actions brought by owners and operators by
issuing orders against arrangers that might support a contribution suit.
These high litigation risks will act to shield arrangers from being held
liable under CERCLA.
The increasing focus on circumstantial evidence to prove intent
benefits arrangers. The incentive for arrangers to escape the liability net is
great; many millions of dollars are at stake. For example, in the litigation
around the Fox River, settlements totaled about $55 million.158 Since
Burlington Northern, PRPs have benefitted from courts examining the
holistic landscape of the transaction. Arranger PRPs and the attorneys
representing them will focus on building a narrative around their liability
using circumstantial evidence. While the useful product standard is not so
low that courts will simply accept the PRPs’ characterization of the
transaction as either a sale or disposal, courts are more willing to look at

157

EPA’s Superfund program, created in 1980, identifies and responds to contaminated sites,
environmental emergencies, and natural disasters. See CENTER FOR HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT & JUSTICE,
SUPERFUND: POLLUTERS PAY SO CHILDREN CAN PLAY 4 (2015), http://chej.org/wpcontent/uploads/Superfund-35th-Anniversary-Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQ2-FNF4]; Superfund,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund [https://perma.cc/ZGZ4-PAUA] (last updated June 21, 2016).
Congress allocates funds to the Superfund program each year, but the program is also funded by
contributions from polluters responsible for contamination. See CENTER FOR HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT &
JUSTICE, supra, at 5.
158
Lower Fox River, supra note 3. This number does not include attorney’s fees or other litigation
related costs. See id.
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other factors than they were prior to Burlington Northern.159 Circumstantial
evidence such as the value of the material and how the material was
managed prior to sale can be preserved such that a good story can be told
that will support the contention that the material at issue is a useful
product.160 Forward-thinking counsel may even take steps to encourage
clients to handle materials more like a useful product and less like waste in
anticipation of possible litigation.
While the shift to a permissive application of the useful product
doctrine will result in lenience for arranger PRPs, this shift will negatively
impact the EPA’s enforcement strategy. One problem with the expansion of
the useful product exception to liability is that at some Superfund sites, the
primary responsible actor has been identified but may be defunct or
otherwise lack the ability to pay.161 Because of this, the agency has to find
creative ways to fund cleanups. These include the pursuit of multiple
arrangers to fund a cleanup in cases where the major players cannot do
so.162 In these cases, arrangers are often the only actors who both
contributed to the contamination and are readily identifiable as viable
financiers for cleanup.163 In other cases, a smaller site, such as a battery
salvage and lead recovery site,164 could be impacted greatly by the useful
159

See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015) (considering the
value of the contaminated buildings as part of the useful product inquiry); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2015) (considering the handling of the transformers
prior to sale as part of the useful product inquiry).
160
Cf. Chris Dow, A Tale of Two Rivers: An Analysis of Different Approaches to Proving Intent for
CERCLA Arranger Liability, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10699, 10705 (2015).
161
An EPA guidance document states: “In some instances, companies have moved or changed
names, requiring several service attempts, or the company may turn out to be bankrupt or defunct.”
EPA, GOWANUS CANAL SUPERFUND SITE POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY (PRP) SEARCH STATUS 1
(2012),
http://www3.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/gowanus/pdf/potentially_responsible_party_
prpsearch_jan2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JF3-VLYM].
162
See David D. Cooke & Robert D. Wyatt, Supreme Court Decision Provides Framework for
Limiting Superfund Cleanup Liability, ALLEN MATKINS (May 4, 2004), http://www.allenmatkins.com/
Publications/Legal-Alerts/2009/05/08_05_2009_Supreme-Court-decision-provides-framework-forlimiting-Superfund.aspx [https://perma.cc/49D5-ZXK4] (stating that one implication of Burlington
Northern would be “the risk that more ‘orphan shares’—shares of cleanup costs allocated to parties that
are dead, defunct or insolvent—will be unfunded”).
163
Hundreds of lead smelting facilities operated in the United States. from 1930 to 1969, and while
these facilities are now largely defunct, they have left behind high levels of lead contamination. Ghost
Factories, SCI. AM. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ghost-factories/
[https://perma.cc/F76E-8YNQ]. Lead smelters typically received products containing varying amounts
of lead from manufacturers and then would smelt them to recover the lead. See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic
Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007). These arranging
manufacturers could potentially finance cleanups in cases where the lead smelter is defunct.
164
See Salman Zafar, The Problem of Used Lead-Acid Batteries, ECOMENA (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:04
AM),
http://www.ecomena.org/managing-lead-acid-batteries/
[https://perma.cc/UY6W-ZGN3]
(describing the process of recycling lead acid batteries and recovering the lead).
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product doctrine as the majority of the actors contributing to contamination
would be arrangers, potentially leaving no solvent party legally responsible
for the cleanup.
The recent case law will likely discourage the pursuit of suits against
arrangers because of the litigation risks and high costs of building a case
against a potential arranger.165 Consequently, the shift in the doctrine will
discourage the EPA from issuing orders finding PRPs liable as arrangers as
these orders may be reversed on appeal or complied with under protest
because the arrangers may believe they have case law on their side. An
arranger could also complete the cleanup and then sue Superfund for
reimbursement,166 arguing that it was not a PRP in the first place given the
useful product case law. This more lenient approach to the useful product
doctrine could also result in a reduced deterrent effect for arrangers.
Arrangers may now be able to behave more recklessly as long as they are
careful to act in such a way that they take advantage of the loopholes the
courts have created.
The enforcement pressure placed on the EPA by the shift in the useful
product doctrine will likely have an impact on the funding for Superfund as
well. Even before Burlington Northern, there was already pressure on
funding.167 Between 2000 and 2010, the EPA allocated about $243 million
per year for Superfund cleanups, but estimated that between $335 million
and $681 million would be needed annually in subsequent years.168 Because
of funding pressure, the National Remedy Review Board streamlines
CERCLA cleanups.169 If the liability net has shrunk because of the recent

165

Litigation costs for building a CERCLA case are already high, and courts allow for fee shifting
in very limited circumstances. See K. Jason Northcutt, Reviving CERCLA’s Liability: Why Government
Agencies Should Recover Their Attorneys’ Fees in Response Cost Recovery Actions, 27 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 779, 782 (2000). The added complications of rebutting the circumstantial and often vague
evidence around the sale of a useful product further increase costs.
166
Supreme Court Says “Yes,” Private Parties Can Sue Under Superfund to Recover Voluntary
Cleanup Costs, SPENCER FANE (June 12, 2007), http://www.spencerfane.com/supreme-courtsays-yes-private-parties-can-sue-under-superfund-to-recover-voluntary-cleanup-costs-06-12-2007/
[https://perma.cc/V2TP-JRDA].
167
Laurel Adams, EPA Superfund Cleanup Costs Outstrip Funding, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Feb. 22, 2011, 7:53 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/22/2121/epa-superfund-cleanupcosts-outstrip-funding [https://perma.cc/E6PX-EW8C].
168
Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND: EPA’S ESTIMATED COSTS
TO REMEDIATE EXISTING SITES EXCEED CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS, AND MORE SITES ARE EXPECTED
TO BE ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10380.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z68Q-76JG].
169
National Remedy Review Board (NRRB), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/national-remedyreview-board-nrrb [https://perma.cc/PU3T-UPD6] (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (explaining that after
the EPA adds Superfund sites to the National Priorities List, the NRRB reviews proposed cleanup

742

111:715 (2017)

Going in CERCLAs

shifts in the useful product doctrine, the number of PRPs who can
contribute to funding cleanups is also smaller.170 Naturally, this will lead to
further cuts in funding.
As mentioned above, the narrowing of arranger liability may mean
that the owner and operator PRPs will pay more to clean up sites. However,
at sites where there is no viable entity responsible for the contamination,
the EPA pays for the cleanup.171 There is still a significant gap in funding
for cleanups such that EPA-funded cleanup may not always be fiscally
feasible.172 The EPA budget for 2016 allocated $190.7 million for the
Superfund Emergency Response and Removal program.173 In addition to
funding these emergency actions, the EPA also encourages PRPs to
conduct removal actions.174 While there is also funding for remedial
cleanups, such funds are allocated to completing projects already in various
stages of the response process, not to new cleanups.175
All of these financial shortcomings culminate in the actual impact that
this shift towards decreased liability will have on the environment itself—
an impact that is potentially catastrophic. With the agency unable to
flexibly enforce against arrangers, and owners and operators similarly
constrained by litigation risks, there will simply be less ability to push
through rapid cleanups for sites heavily impacted by arrangers. This raises
the specter of real environmental harm as Superfund sites are allowed to
languish for years without cleanup. The impact that Superfund sites can
have on human and environmental health is demonstrated by current sites
that have not been properly cleaned up.176 A telling example of this is the
decisions for various criteria including cost effectiveness and ensures that all decisions “meet costbased review criteria”).
170
Superfund litigation was decreasing even before Burlington Northern. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-656, SUPERFUND: LITIGATION HAS DECREASED AND EPA NEEDS
BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING
REQUIREMENTS 7 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09656.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9SS-JRJU].
171
DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30798, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS:
SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 58–
59 (2010).
172
See EPA, FY 2016: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 47–48 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_combined_v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB3X-U5CE].
173
This money is focused on emergency removal and response action. See id.
174
See id. (“[T]he EPA will complete or oversee a total of 275 Superfund-lead and PRP-lead
removal actions . . . .”).
175
See id. at 48.
176
As of November 29, 2016, there were 1337 sites listed on the National Priorities List.
Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-nationalpriorities-list-npl [https://perma.cc/HH6V-G2YQ] (last updated May 6, 2016). Languishing Superfund
sites could also impede other redevelopment efforts as developers may not want to take on the burden
of occupying and building on contaminated land.
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Pearl Harbor Naval Complex in Hawaii, a site where PCBs, mercury, and
volatile organic compounds have been found in the soil, and could
eventually be released as harmful gases into the air.177 The hazardous waste
sources found below the ground surface at Pearl Harbor also pose possible
groundwater contamination issues in an area where about 110,000 people
get their drinking water from wells.178 At the McCormick & Baxter
Creosoting Company site in Stockton, California, a plant that treated utility
posts and railroad ties with heavy metals, site-related toxins have been
found in fish that are caught and consumed by the local population.179 The
contaminants at the aforementioned sites have been linked to various health
problems, including cancer, birth defects, and damage to the liver, the
kidneys, and the central nervous system.180 These two sites are only a
sampling of the many Superfund sites that have not been cleaned up across
the country and continue to pose harm to human health and the
environment.181
In the current climate, where courts have not held many arrangers
liable under CERCLA due to a more permissive approach to the useful
product doctrine, sites impacted chiefly by arrangers may also be treated as
177

Pearl Harbor Naval Complex, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/
ViewByEPAID/HI4170090076 [https://perma.cc/W7QL-Y4GL] (last updated Jan. 20, 2015); Kelly
Zhou, Red, White, and Deadly: 8 of the Worst American Superfund Sites, TAKEPART (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.takepart.com/photos/worst-superfund-sites/super-filthy [https://perma.cc/D63R-8K99].
178
Zhou, supra note 177.
179
McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/
ViewByEPAID/cad009106527?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/5A5S-P3RP] (last updated Apr. 29,
2015); Zhou, supra note 177.
180
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Toxicity: What Are Adverse Health Effects of PCB
Exposure?, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (May 14, 2014), https://www.atsdr.
cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=30&po=10 [https://perma.cc/B2T3-SZ94]; Reproductive Health and the
Workplace, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/repro/heavymetals.html [https://perma.cc/EKM8APRR] (last updated Feb. 27, 2015); Volatile Organic Compounds’ Impact on Indoor Air Quality, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-quality-iaq/volatile-organic-compounds-impact-indoor-air-quality
[https://perma.cc/GYL6-RUUX] (last updated Sept. 7, 2016).
181
The 38,000 people living near the Duwamish River Superfund site in the South Park,
Georgetown, and Beacon Hill neighborhoods of Seattle suffer from higher rates of asthma, diabetes,
and colorectal cancer than the rest of King County. Carol Smith, The High Health Costs of a Seattle’s
Superfund Site: It Can Take Years Off Your Life, INVESTIGATEWEST (Mar. 20, 2011), http://invw.org/
2011/03/20/health-along-the-duwamish-a-superfund-runs-through-it/ [https://perma.cc/9MGC-WLFE].
There is also a higher infant mortality rate and lower life expectancy in these neighborhoods that has
been linked in part to the proximity of the still contaminated site. Id. In Massachusetts, thirty-one sites
pose an imminent health risk. Beverly Ford, The Bay State’s Toxic Legacy, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(May 24, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/05/24/4723/bay-states-toxic-legacy-0
[https://perma.cc/GN76-3JCC]. At the New Bedford Harbor site, where seafood has been contaminated
with PCBs, the EPA has classified the human exposure risk as “not under control.” Id. Residents near a
site in Wilmington, Massachusetts are concerned that a cancer cluster is connected to toxins found in
wells in 2002. Id.
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a lower priority. In order to get cleaned up, Superfund sites must be
evaluated by the National Remedy Review Board and be listed on the
National Priorities List (NPL).182 Sites that are treated as lesser priorities
may never be listed on the NPL or may simply languish there, stalled due
to lack of funding.183 However, sites impacted by arrangements for disposal
are not less harmful to environmental or human health.184 There are many
current Superfund sites that could be impacted by this narrowed doctrine.185
182

See Basic NPL Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/basic-npl-information
[https://perma.cc/8WKG-7HQN] (last updated May 4, 2016); National Remedy Review Board (NRRB),
supra note 169. A small subset of Superfund cleanups occur outside the NPL process. See Superfund
Alternative
Approach,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-alternative-approach
[https://perma.cc/K6DK-GC5R] (last updated Mar. 10, 2016).
183
See Juliet Eilperin, Lack of Funding Slows Cleanup of Hundreds of Superfund Sites, WASH.
POST (Nov. 25, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11246-2004Nov24.html
[https://perma.cc/AF2R-G4H8].
184
Consider residential neighborhoods impacted by defunct lead smelters. Lead exposure can do
significant damage to human health, even in small amounts, leading to a wide range of serious physical
and developmental problems. See Ghost Factories, supra note 163. Children are particularly vulnerable.
See id. While not linked to a defunct lead smelter, the 2016 public health crisis in Flint, Michigan,
where corrosive water caused lead from pipes to leach into the drinking water supply, highlights the
very serious dangers that lead contamination can pose to human and environmental health. See Julie
Bosman et al., As Water Problems Grew, Officials Belittled Complaints from Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/TM6W-6435]. Furthermore, Congress and the EPA are well aware of the dangers that
arranger transactions can pose to both human and environmental health. The EPA warns of the hazards
of these types of transactions:
Hazardous secondary materials stored or transported prior to recycling have the potential to
present the same types of threats to human health and the environment as hazardous wastes
stored or transported prior to disposal. In fact, EPA has found that recycling operations have
accounted for a number of significant damage incidents. . . . [H]azardous secondary materials
destined for recycling were involved in one-third of the first 60 filings under RCRA’s imminent
and substantial endangerment authority and in 20 of the initial 160 hazardous material sites
listed for potential clean up under [CERCLA]. Congress also cited some damage cases which
involve recycling . . . . Additional data . . . included in the rulemaking docket for today’s rule
corroborate the fact that recycling operations can and have resulted in significant damage
incidents.
Definition of Solid Waste, 80 Fed. Reg. 1,694, 1,696 (Jan. 13, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
185
Sites like the residential areas impacted by defunct lead smelters will be most seriously
impacted by this narrowing of arranger liability. See Ghost Factories, supra note 163. The last lead
smelter in the United States was closed in 2013, meaning that the majority of these entities are likely
defunct and may not have parent companies to pursue in contribution actions. See Leah Thorsen,
Smelter’s Closure Is End of an Era in Herculaneum, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2013),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/smelter-s-closure-is-end-of-an-era-in-herculaneum/article_
021e81bb-43f0-52ba-aadf-fe36681a0ad0.html [https://perma.cc/MD8H-BCWW]. The EPA cites
thirteen Superfund cleanups across the country that were impacted by historic smelting and mining
activities as just a few examples of sites where lead testing needed to be performed on people in the
area. See Lead at Superfund Sites, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/lead-superfund-sites
[https://perma.cc/XB4E-6C7H] (last updated June 14, 2016). If arrangers cannot be sought to help
finance cleanups of these types because of the current state of the case law and the main actors (the lead
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The recent court decisions will not only impact the ability of the agency to
enforce against the arranging PRPs, but will also slow down cleanups and
have a negative impact on human health and the environment.186
Lower courts should scale back this move towards leniency while
respecting Burlington Northern. The Court’s holding, while it did change
the intent standard for arrangers, was so vague as to allow for different
interpretations.187 Lower courts in the useful product arena have taken a
broad view of the case, using it as a jumping-off point to promote the
permissive, pro-defendant trend that has emerged in recent cases. Because
of Burlington Northern’s flexibility, lower courts can revert back to some
of the values of the pre-Burlington Northern world without disturbing
Supreme Court precedent. They can do this in part by considering agency
liability findings when making decisions about arranger liability, as
discussed in the next Part.
IV.

AN INDICATIVE SHIFT?

Judicial deference to agencies is a complex and difficult area of the
law and likely only tells part of the story in the useful product arena.188
However, there is some evidence that the shift away from wide-reaching
liability in the useful product context is symptomatic of a larger trend in
administrative law. Since Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,189 the Court has attempted “to reassert the primacy

smelters) are unable to pay, the cost of the cleanup will fall to the agency, which will stretch the EPA’s
already strained Superfund budget and potentially stall the cleanup.
186
Abandoned lead smelters illustrate the recent slowdown in cleanups. In April 2001,
environmental scientist William Eckel compiled a list of 400 potential lead-smelting sites that had been
abandoned and were unknown to regulators. See Alison Young, Long-Gone Lead Factories Leave
Poisons in Nearby Yards, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/story/2012-04-19/smelting-lead-contamination-government-failure/54399578/1
[https://
perma.cc/5FBJ-YV33]. A USA Today investigation found that regulators had done little to address the
danger posed by these sites. Id. As of 2012, only eighteen sites had received any sort of cleanup. Id.
Any cleanups of these sites may end up being funded by taxpayers, in part because many lead smelters
are now defunct and the recent developments in arranger liability have left these sites with no private
party to pay for cleanup. See Alison Young, Old Lead Factories May Stick Taxpayers with Cleanup
Costs, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/
19/lead-smelter-cleanup-liabilities/1766747/ [https://perma.cc/W6WC-NSYJ].
187
MARK MISIOROWSKI & JOEL D. EAGLE, AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S BURLINGTON NORTHERN
DECISION 17 (2009), http://www.thompsonhine.com/uploads/1228/doc/DRI_Burlington_Northern.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8TC-K5XT].
188
The deference inquiry in this space is complicated by the fact that while CERCLA cases often
involve agency actions, they do not always involve them, such as when a private party seeks to recover
cleanup costs.
189
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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of the judiciary.”190 For example, in United States v. Mead Corp.,191 the
Court expressly reduced the deference afforded to an agency when the
interpretation at issue did not result from formal procedure.192 The Mead
Court ultimately held that a tariff classification issued by the U.S. Customs
Service did not carry the force of law and was not entitled to Chevron
deference.193 The Mead analysis is a threshold inquiry to determine whether
an agency action receives Chevron deference. If Congress did not delegate
authority to an agency to “make rules carrying the force of law,” no
Chevron deference should be afforded.194 Whether an agency action has the
force of law is a complicated inquiry, but the Court emphasized that actions
preceded by formal administrative processes such as formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking carry the force of law.195 Mead and other
similar cases challenging agency action demonstrate decreased deference
and increased judicial involvement in evaluating agency decisions.196 This
represents a significant shift from the previous world order in which courts
had given substantial deference to agency interpretations.197
The shift in judicial application of the useful product doctrine
correlates with this larger change from substantial deference to measured
skepticism. The EPA finding of liability is an informal agency action that is
not the result of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.198
This agency finding serves as the basis of the government’s complaint
against an arranger or is relied on by the PRP initiating a contribution

190

Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
192
David Marshall Coover, III, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Why the Environmental Protection
Agency’s New Section 111 Greenhouse Gas Regulations Do Not Fit in with Supreme Court Precedent
or Congressional Intent in the Clean Air Act, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (2015).
193
533 U.S. at 226–27. The Court held: “[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Id. Instead, the Court found that the
customs classifications at issue are “best treated like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines’” and are therefore “beyond the Chevron pale.” Id. at 234
(quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
194
Id. at 226–27.
195
See id. at 229–30; Giacomo Gallai, Note, United States v. Mead Corp.: Will Administrative
Transparency Survive the Increasing Demand for National Security?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 725, 728
(2003).
196
See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 190.
197
The dissent in Christensen v. Harris County emphasized the Court’s departure from the
Chevron standard. See 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because there is no reason to believe
that the Department’s opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and consistently observed, it
unquestionably merits our respect.”).
198
See Superfund Unilateral Orders, supra note 29.
191
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action as evidence of the arranger status of the PRP it is suing.199 While
these liability determinations warrant no formal judicial deference,200 the
pre-Burlington Northern cases demonstrate unofficial deference to agency
findings consistent with a pre-Mead world,201 even if courts were not
explicitly required to be deferential. The pre-Burlington Northern courts’
narrow application of the useful product doctrine and more or less
consistent findings that selling hazardous secondary materials constituted
arranging for disposal, reflected a general willingness to accept EPA
liability determinations in arranger cases.202 In contrast, the cases postBurlington Northern are consistent with the decreased deference to agency
determinations after Mead in that courts are engaging in a far more
searching inquiry into intent, and more often than not, finding for the
defendant arranger.203
The increasing primacy of the judiciary204 is apparent in the useful
product cases. Recent courts have engaged much more deeply with the
useful product doctrine, considering circumstantial evidence ranging from
the value of the material to how it was handled in determining the intent of
the potential arranger.205 This more holistic inquiry indicates a decreased
regard for the agency finding in support of defendant arranger liability.
Admittedly, a change in attitude toward agency deference is not the only
potential contributor to this shift. This shift could also be reflective of the
judiciary’s larger distrust of CERCLA in that it seeks to regulate activity

199

This is codified in a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) issued under CERCLA § 106 that
identifies liable parties and outlines facts supporting liability. See DON. R. CLAY, OFF. OF SOLID WASTE
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, OSWER DIRECTIVE NO. 9833.0-1a, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA SECTION
106(a) UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR REMEDIAL DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS 1, 7,
12–13 (1990). In useful product cases, the UAO would contend that the party arranged for disposal by
sending hazardous materials to a third party that ultimately contaminated the environment. If the PRP
refuses to assist with the cleanup despite the threats of treble damages and penalties, the EPA refers the
case to DOJ, which then files suit, alleging that the EPA issued a valid UAO and the party is liable. See
id. at 3–5; Superfund Unilateral Orders, supra note 29. Alternatively, the EPA could undertake the
cleanup and refer the cost recovery claim to the DOJ. See CLAY, supra, at 3–5.
200
See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Congress . . . designated the
courts and not EPA as the adjudicator of the scope of CERCLA liability.”).
201
See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 683–84 (3d Cir. 2003);
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380–82 (8th Cir. 1989).
202
See cases cited supra note 201.
203
See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 808 F.3d 342, 350–51 (8th Cir. 2015); Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 155 (4th Cir. 2015); NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.,
768 F.3d 682, 707 (7th Cir. 2014); Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901, 911
(9th Cir. 2011).
204
See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 190.
205
See supra Section II.C.
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that a layperson would not find objectionable,206 or even as part of a larger
backlash against the perceived unfairness of the statute.207
The impact of Mead has already been documented in other
environmental regulatory spaces. The Ninth Circuit in Hall v. EPA found
that the EPA was not entitled to deference in its approval or denial of state
revisions to air quality plans under the Clean Air Act.208 In Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc., v. City of New York, the
Second Circuit denied deference to the EPA position that the Clean Water
Act discharge permit requirements do not apply to dams.209 Scholars have
identified other possible areas where Mead could overturn agency action,
including the National Standard Guidelines promulgated by the National
Marine Fisheries Service210 and an Instruction Memorandum issued by the
Bureau of Land Management.211 Courts in these areas have relied on Mead
to deny Chevron deference to agency interpretations and have increased the
primacy of the judiciary accordingly.
Even if courts are not required to defer to agency findings of liability
in the useful product arena,212 courts should return to allowing some
deference in practice, as occurred in the pre-Burlington Northern world.
The Mead Court found that even if an agency decision was not entitled to
Chevron deference, courts could consider the factors introduced in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.213 in assessing how an agency’s action should be
weighed.214 While no formal deference is due the EPA liability
determinations under CERCLA, the Skidmore factors—care, consistency,
formality, expertise, and persuasiveness—can still guide a court’s decision
206

See Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20 COLO. LAW. 435, 444 (1991) (“EPA
and the U.S. Justice Department clearly need reminding that a liability-based cleanup system will be
acceptable to the public only if enforcement agencies learn to exercise a sense of fairness and a
modicum of common sense.”).
207
See James M. Sweeney, Opening the Front Door: The Argument for a Causal Requirement in
Multisite CERCLA Litigation, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1989, 2009 (1999) (“The nearly impossible burden
placed on defendants within this framework creates a perception of CERCLA’s liability scheme as
inequitable among both litigants and the judiciary.”).
208
273 F.3d 1146, 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2001).
209
273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001).
210
See Lindsay J. Nichols, Comment, The NMFS’s National Standard Guidelines: Why Judicial
Deference May Be Inevitable, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1397–99 (2003).
211
See Megan J. Anderson, The Energy Policy Act and Its Categorical Exclusions: What
Happened to the Extraordinary Circumstance Exception?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 119,
129–31 (2008).
212
See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
213
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
214
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (“[C]ourts have looked to the degree of
the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency’s position.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40).
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under the useful product doctrine.215 In this context, courts should rely most
heavily on the expertise of the agency in considering whether to defer to a
defendant’s colorable claim or to consider the EPA’s finding of liability.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mead, asserted that Skidmore deference to
agency expertise is a “statement of the obvious: A judge should take into
account the well-considered views of expert observers.”216 In the useful
product context, liability determinations are technical, fact-specific, and
complex.217 Because of this complexity, it is unlikely that judges can apply
the useful product doctrine as proficiently or consistently as the EPA.218 For
these reasons, the agency’s finding of liability should be carefully
considered in courts’ decisionmaking process in useful product cases.
CONCLUSION
Today, communities along the Fox River are still grappling with how
to deal with the legacy of the carbonless copy paper revolution. The river
remains contaminated with PCBs. There has been a fish consumption
advisory in place since 1976.219 Remediation efforts have been costly and
time-consuming, and they are not yet finished.220 Because NCR was able to
escape arranger liability due to courts’ new interpretation of the useful
product doctrine, a source of funding for the cleanup has been eliminated.
The responsibility for financing the remaining cleanup falls to a shrinking

215

See id.
Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217
CERCLA is a notoriously complex statute that combines nuanced legal judgments with
complex technical determinations. Practitioners have described aspects of the statute as “prohibitively
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the Fox River Litigation, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.apks.com/es/perspectives/
publications/2015/10/untangling-cercla-divisibility-and-the-ifox-rive__ [https://perma.cc/969T-NZKE];
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estimated to cost $1 billion. See Srubas, supra note 5.
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number of PRPs and may ultimately shift the burden of funding the cleanup
from the private sector to the public purse.
Although minor in terms of its lasting technological impact, as we
approach the sixty-third anniversary of the invention of carbonless copy
paper, the environmental damage of this novelty is not inconsequential. If
success is measured by the number of sites cleaned up and the speed with
which such sites are addressed, then the “polluters must pay” sentiment in
CERCLA legislative history, the plain language of the statute itself, and the
expert findings of the EPA should guide judicial decisionmaking. To
rectify the damage that has already been done to the Fox River and to
rectify similar damage that has been wrought by arrangers across the
country, it is critical that courts begin to curb this trend of permissive
arranger liability by walking back the lower court’s expansion of
Burlington Northern’s already permissive rule and carefully considering
agency liability determinations. In doing so, they will return to CERCLA’s
statutory roots and facilitate cleanups by forcing the polluters responsible
to bear the costs of the cleanup.
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